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The Cause Lawyer's Cause
Frank Munger*
The promise of human rights in South Africa may depend significantly
on the course chosen by aprofessionaland relatively independentSouth
African judiciary.But what about the promise of human rights in
other developing states which lack a judiciary with similarpotential?
Cause lawyers, increasingly visible in many of these new states, are
presumed carriersof liberal legalism and democracy and celebrated
for their courageous defence of human rights even in the absence of
an independent court system. This comment argues that celebration
of cause lawyers may reflect presumptions about their causes that are
questionable even in the Global North, but decidedly premature in
the Global South. In actuality cause lawyers represent both liberal
causes and causes that are decidedly illiberal. Yet their work may still
contribute to the defence of human rights. The value of cause lawyers
lies not in their embrace of liberal legalism, as it is understood in
the Global North, but rather in the variety of causes that they strive
to make viable. Where space for a broad range of causes has been
opened, the cause of human rights may also remain viable. But this
is not a secure expectation, for cause lawyers, and the fate of their
causes, derive meaning, support, and opportunities to move forward
from social conditions not under their control. A necessary conclusion
is that the contributions of cause lawyers to the progress of human
rights and the rule of law must be evaluated with care.

Imagination
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1983) describes law as a work of imagination. Imagination 'narrows' and 'schematizes' the details of life observed
and experienced so that rules can apply (1983: 170). A rule of law requires
rules but also an image of the world in which law serves a purpose.
The imagination of a judiciary may be strongly influenced by a shared
understanding of political institutions unifying a governing elite. Decisions
by South African judges under apartheid supported the government in part
because they were compelled to follow the statutory law of a constitutionally supreme parliament. But, as Professor Stephen Ellmann's comment
on the courts concludes, this explanation falls far short of explaining
the racism of South Africa's Supreme Court. Decisions by South African
judges under apartheid also supported the government because members
of the judiciary accepted the race-divided world imagined by apartheid's
authors. The judges may have embraced the vision or declined to resist
that vision for other reasons, but seldom questioned the legitimacy of
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South African apartheid law. Court decisions aided the struggle against
apartheid, but these occasions were exceptional and could not undermine
the dominance of that vision without a political sea-change (Abel, 1998a).

Professor Ellman's Purposive Formalism
Martin Chanock, whom we honour in this conference, worried about
whether the South African legal system could overcome not only its legacy
of decisions supporting key institutions of apartheid but also its legacy of
racial imagination. Professor Stephen Ellmann's comment (2012) suggests
a path toward restoration of law's legitimacy through judicial decisions
based on a purposive formalism, that is, through decisions based on principled interpretation of the law while encouraging articulation of a broad
range of claims for popular justice unheard under the previous regime.
Professor Ellmann's comment singles out the promise of the South
African judiciary. Under apartheid, courts retained a measure of independence and formalism in much of their ordinary jurisprudence and
their reputation for professionalism has survived. Ellmann argues that
the courts might craft a jurisprudence that avoids two possible extremes:
apolitical formalism, which ignores the need for corrective justice; and
subordination to the post-apartheid demand for popular justice in all its
potentially extreme forms. Building on their strong reputation for professionalism in non-racial jurisprudence, the judiciary might craft decisions
that balance principles and a sense of justice.
Many other societies of the Global South lack a legacy of judicial
capacity for building a liberal rule of law. Some new states have adapted
a judiciary modelled on the civil law systems of Prussian or French administrative states which limit the power of ordinary courts and emphasise
judicial interpretation serving the purposes of the state. Others lack an
independent judiciary because law, of any kind, was subordinated to
the state's political interests (see Dezalay and Garth, 2010). A further
distinction which may limit hope for judicial leadership elsewhere is that
the legal systems of many new states, though adapted from European or
American models, lack anything similar to the influence of natural law,
the ethical system which has informed law's purposes in many Western
systems of jurisprudence.

Cause Lawyers
If many of the states of the Global South have judicial institutions that are
far less promising than South Africa's, they have grass-roots movements
for justice, and they have lawyers, if not courts, who readily support them.
Cause lawyers have been defined by American scholars Austin Sarat and
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Stuart Scheingold as lawyers who practice with a 'vision of the good life'
(1998: 1). Their understanding of the cause lawyer's vision is that it is
fundamentally based on a liberal rule of law in a democratic society, institutions taken for granted in economically developed and politically stable
democracies, especially in the United States. According to this influential
view, cause lawyers are agents of social change, favouring liberal legality
and democracy.
Lawyers committed to a liberal vision of the rule of law are an important element in the global discourse of democratisation, human rights,
and rule of law, both in South Africa and internationally. 'Cause lawyers'
seem to offer hope of the kind Professor Ellmann seeks. His inquiry is
responsive to Martin Chanock's ill-ease about the future of South African
law, but it is even more compelling because his hopes reflect human rights
values associated with the globalisation of law, hopes for law in new states
of the Global South, and, as Professor Ellmann has expressed elsewhere
(1998), a meaningful role for cause lawyers.
Cause lawyers are closely associated with imagining the implementation of human rights, and the global emergence of'cause lawyers' has been
celebrated as evidence that law's compelling ideals are taking hold in the
Global South. South Africa is one such case, where a handful of lawyers
fought for the rule of law before apartheid ended (Abel, 1998a) and where
social movements together with South Africa's evolving constitutional
jurisprudence have become important illustrations of the potential of
cause lawyers to the globalisation of law.

The Trouble with Cause Lawyers
Before placing our faith in cause lawyers, we should have some concerns
about Sarat and Scheingold's conceptualisation of their role and the optimism that seems to be the starting point for a great deal of scholarship
and commentary. How independent can cause lawyers be from the culture
and politics of the society that they are seeking to transform and that
shapes their self-perceptions and actions? The presumption that cause
lawyers are likely to be carriers of liberal legalism and globalisation of
international human rights reflects mostly experience in the Global North
and, more specifically, the United States. The role and success of cause
lawyers in the United States is embedded in a specific form of federalism
and common law jurisprudence which encouraged lawyers and courts to
collaborate as power brokers at every level of government (Abel, 1998b).
In other societies, especially those which lack both the influence of the
common law and equally favourable political institutions, the place of
cause lawyers is far less certain.
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Even if such goals were meaningful in political contexts where law
has never played such a role, how do we know that is what cause lawyers
actually want?
By definition, cause lawyers pursue social change and law may be no
more than a means. The social cause may include strengthening democracy or the rule of law, but is more likely to emphasise transformation
of the social order, redistribution of power, or changes in existing law.
Cause law in the United States has not been limited to the defenceless,
weak and politically marginal or to those who seek greater democracy.
The relationship between the cause lawyer's cause and the cause of liberal
legalism is by no means so clear, unless we understand the cause lawyer's
place in the institutional structure which connects law to politics.
In March 2007, young lawyers in Pakistan inspired rule of law advocates everywhere by taking to the streets to protest the arbitrary removal
of Pakistan's Chief Justice by a dictatorial Prime Minister. Unprecedented
sympathy rallies by lawyers in the United States and elsewhere embraced
the cause of the Young Lawyers Movement, admiring their courage and
celebrating the power of rule of law ideals. The YLM was accepted as an
illustration of the benefits of investing in law. Taken for granted was an
identity of commitment by the cause lawyers and their colleagues in New
York, London and elsewhere to a similar kind of society under the rule
of law.
But rule of law movements may take unpredictable turns. In 2011,
the same members of the Young Lawyers Movement showered rose petals
over the assassin of an outspoken critic of Pakistan's strict Islamic blasphemy laws. This time the young lawyers denounced the liberal values of
the West while upholding the superiority of Shari'a law (Gall, 2011; see
Gahias, 2010). In the Global South, rule of law, like democracy, may be
a discourse of resistance to existing institutions rather than a blueprint
for new ones.
We should be cautious about celebrating a cause lawyer simply for
pursuing a vision opposed to established authority. Of course, we might
choose to celebrate only those cause lawyers whose vision is precisely
the same as our own, but in doing so we deny validity to any view of the
benefits of law but our own and we ignore the complex process of social
construction required to establish the authority of law or human rights
in a society different from our own. And if we believe that cause lawyers
should sometimes be celebrated even if their vision of the good life is
different from our own, which ones should we support? Which do we think
will ultimately prove beneficial in the way that Professor Ellmann hopes?
Reflecting a lifetime of studying the development of legal institutions
in Indonesia and Malaysia, Lev (2000) cautions that in new states:
[P]ressures toward constitutionalism and more effective legal process have
advantages and suffer constraints quite different from those of old Europe
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... []deas, in Asia as in Europe or anywhere else, take hold only when they
make sense domestically and are adapted to domestic purposes. (5)
The Young Lawyers Movement is very much a local adaptation, reflecting the strong foundations for law and the promise that law offers the
politically ambitious. At the same time the YLM also illustrates the great
uncertainty about the law's liberalising influence. The YLM reflects the
Muslim identities in Pakistan that may completely undermine liberal rule
of law. Cause lawyers representing visions of an illiberal state, where the
power and even the form of the state are very much in play, may have
quite the opposite effect from that expected by those who have celebrated
the emergence of cause lawyers.

Cause Lawyers and Elite Politics
A further concern about cause lawyers has been raised by Dezalay and
Garth's important comparative studies of legal evolution in Latin America
and Asia, which elaborate the truism that the political institutions of a
society determine the role that law can play. Although the globalisation
of rights has become an important goal of governments and international
agencies of the Global North, legal evolution in the Global South has
been full of puzzles and disappointments. Dezalay and Garth's research
follows 'carriers' who have been influenced by law from the Global North,
observing when and why transfers of law succeed or fail in new states.
They conclude that law succeeds as a resource independent of state domination when colonial, international, and local elites have a stake in legal
institutions and the legal profession has sufficient social, economic, and
other forms of 'capitar to resist domination. In the United States, cause
lawyers benefit from the independence that has been achieved by powerbrokering elite lawyers who have established themselves 'in the field of
state power'. Where colonial era investments are sufficient, Dezalay and
Garth conclude, law retains some independence. But the legal systems of
most new states lack founders with political independence and their legal
systems will continue to lack independence until domestic elites remake
them.
Dezalay and Garth describe many examples of the success or failure of
elite projects of legal construction supporting their general conclusion that
elite politics determine the independence of law. If valid, their conclusion
has profound significance for the emergence of cause lawyers, because the
relationship between elite politics and legal institutions seems to be far
more important for realising liberal legality than the training or ideals
of cause lawyers.
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New Places to Look for Cause Lawyering
Where does this leave cause lawyers or a 'cause' judiciary? The answer is
that there are many examples of cause lawyers' contributions to progress
toward greater respect for human rights, state accountability, and access
to justice in transitional societies, although their influence on longer term
institutional change is not at all certain. We can say first that Dezalay
and Garth present a picture of legal evolution that appears far too monolithic and centralised to reflect how change actually occurs. Because law
is indisputably the 'skeleton of the modern state' (Lev, 2000), even in
authoritarian or transitional states lawyers are experts on the state's
anatomy, so to speak. Even where courts provide little access, cause
lawyers can help support and consolidate incremental social change in the
spaces that politics create for at least three distinct reasons.
First, grassroots advocates are simply more important than Dezalay
and Garth seem to suggest. Rejecting the elite-centred theory of legal
change, Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito (2005) argue that Dezalay and
Garth overlook the importance of grassroots activism:
Missing from this top-down picture are the myriad local, non-Englishspeaking actors - from grassroots organizations to community leaders
- who albeit oftentimes working in alliance with transnational NGOs and
progressive elites, mobilize popular resistance to neoliberal legality while
remaining as local as ever ... The analysis [also] misses differences among
sectors of the elites that are as real as the links among them. (11)
Santos and Rodriguez -Garavito suggest not only that Dezalay and Garth's
mapping of actors is incomplete, but that their conceptualisation of global
influence conflates networks of influence with 'deterministic' control.
Global funders and legitimators may facilitate or limit certain forms
of resistance to authority, but they do not control the commitments or
strategies of their beneficiaries or the spread of values and beliefs, which
may have important long term consequences for social movements and
contention for power.
Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito also argue that the independence of
law can be supported in local, as opposed to national, fields of power and
by transnational counter-hegemonic ideology. A full understanding of the
role of the long history of investment in the legal evolution of societies
in the Global South would also require a broader and deeper study of
indigenous law and culture with special attention to the role of the lower
levels of administration and local governance that may be sites of law's
construction as important as the palace wars of the capital.
Examples of successful cause lawyering (and very likely cause judicial
action) are much more likely to occur locally than in the national spotlight where they pose a greater threat to political stability. Openings for
interpretation and choice among alternatives are a necessary feature of
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any system of rules, especially at the front line of administration, and a
new, more democratic or liberal understanding at this level may take hold
where advocates bring persuasive evidence of changes in society to the
attention of local decision makers.
Local courts and other systems of administrative accountability have
important functions other than coercing compliance with rules of conduct,
functions that have less obvious political significance and still may support
change. These include the power to decide who will decide an issue, the
power to bring opposing parties together, and the power to legitimate the
right to seek redress and to have rights, regardless of outcome.
Second, local cause lawyering that may have limited effectiveness
on its own may work together with external pressures on other levels of
government to make international human rights regimes enforceable, as
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink have suggested (1999). International accords
on human trafficking, the environment, or women's rights may have a
better chance at the national level where a domestic constituency or social
movement also demands such rights and generates situations in which
international commitments can be tested.
Third, the terrain of cause lawyering may be much larger than the
courts. In the course of my research on cause lawyers in Southeast Asia,
interviews repeatedly referred not to their role in recruiting the support
of the courts but to networks that permeated the formal boundaries of
the administrative state. Because courts were seldom involved in bringing about changes in government action, networks which incorporated

members of the bureaucracy served this role. Some social cause advocates
mobilised the authority of the state by invoking the power of higher level
bureaucrats, or through relationships with lower level officials based on
long-standing mutual support or the authority of their expertise. Others
employ different strategies. Their roles as advisers, collaborators, and
as advocates for new norms are used to persuade or even to 'discipline'
lower level officials resistant to accommodating the needs of those over
whom they had authority (Munger, Kottakis and Rivas, 2010). Often, the
point of contention between NGO staff members and front line government officials, such as police, immigration inspectors, labour department
investigators, or health officials, has been competing visions of the public
interest, between bureaucratic traditions serving 'insiders' and a more
2
expansive view of public responsibility and, in some cases, rights.
The implications of such strategies for longer term construction of
state power may be subtle but important. Although cooptation of key
front line officials in a ministry may not survive the particular players in
the network, over time strategic advocacy may lead to more stable social
construction of authority based on investment by the mutually interacting
players, often anticipated by longer standing but unenforced formal rules,
and which either reduces conflict with or wins the support of influential
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outsiders. This may be especially the case, but by no means a prerequisite
for change, if the NGO's approach is reinforced internally, for example, by
a few front line officials with a sympathetic understanding of the NGO's
cause, or externally, for example, by the discourses and pressures from
Global North agencies, governments, scholars, media, philanthropies, and
other social advocacy groups. NGO activity which brings about shortterm investments by officials at different levels of government may reduce
agency costs over time as workloads and work routines are adjusted to
the mutually agreed norms. Therefore, such investments may persist.
Further, social cause advocacy can help importing governments with one
of the most vexing problems of globalisation, by delegating management
of conflicts between domestic political expectations and the rule of law
expectations of Western governments and agencies to the NGO staff
members.
Over time, ruling elites in the Global South, like their European
counterparts, have encountered an expanding circle of internal and global
constituencies which they must coerce or persuade of their legitimacy.
Education and economic globalisation have greatly expanded the demands
of internal constituencies for governance. The growing importance of
commercial and capitalist classes creates a demand for more technically
competent bureaucratic administration. In recent decades, allegations
of corruption, growing regulatory complexity, and fiscal crisis, as well
as pressure from competing transnational business interests, may have
created greater demand for rationalisation and third party monitoring
of the performance of government officials. These factors may explain
a notable rise in the importance of administrative courts in new states
throughout Asia (Ginsburg, 2009). Elites have played a part in each of
these changes, but they have not acted alone.
Finally, legal change need not be a project that is limited to lawyers
or courts at all. Indeed, cause lawyers depend on a willing client, and
potential clients have alternatives beyond those offered by lawyers or the
law (Munger, 2010; Engel and Munger, 2003). Gillespie's studies of uses of
law by businesses in Vietnam reveal that a variety of legal discourses are
deployed in encounters between bureaucrats, local officials and entrepreneurs without the mediation of courts and often without lawyers (2011).
Merry's research on the influence of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women (CEDAW) suggests that
much of the work of integrating 'universar and 'local' interpretations of
the relationship between women's status and rights under the Convention
is done locally by informal interpreters or the rights bearers themselves
(2006).
The emergence of alternative visions of state power through these
local adaptations may or may not be the first signs of broader change but
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will, at the very least encourage others to seek a wider space for claims
and action.

The Uncertain Importance of Cause Lawyers: A
Structural Understanding
What enables these local sources of legal change to contribute to more
open and equal access to rights and to power, in spite of the diverse and
unpredictable goals of cause lawyers and the uncertainties of their efforts?
All of this seems to suggest that we should not celebrate the cause
lawyer's cause, but rather the very presence of cause lawyers whatever
the cause, for the conditions that enable cause lawyers to pursue their
causes, whatever the cause, are the change desired by advocates for the
rule of law.
To have value as a symbolic resource in opposing arbitrary use of
power, law must be supported by other power holders, that is, law must
be legitimate. In some stable democracies, this condition is met by an
independent (which is not to say apolitical) judiciary and strong legal
profession (backed by strong clients). Support is more problematic where
such institutional independence has never existed.
Many Global South societies confront this problem, and one proposed
remedy is to create independent, often constitutionally independent,
bodies to monitor the state. This solution is particularly favoured by
international business interests as well as some pro-democracy advocates,
and has led to the establishment of constitutional courts, administrative
courts, and specialised independent bodies to oversee state regulation of
elections, the media, protection of intellectual property, corruption and
other key areas of administration. The new institutions, not coincidentally, often reflect global, that is to say 'Washington Consensus', priorities,
including protection of investments and property but also strengthening
human rights associated with democratic and limited government.
This judicialization' of government in new states has been the subject
of trenchant criticism as well as favourable comment (Ginsburg, 2009).
An important concern is that creation of independent agencies to offset
authoritarian politics removes decision making from fledgling, if often
imperfect, democratic decision making. Where there has been a tradition
of elite rule, members of the elite are likely to staff the new institutions,
further entrenching their political power.
But strengthening rights need not involve a grand political strategy of
institutional reform. Incremental gains are made by persuading local decision makers with power to view alternatives in a different way, perhaps
only a slightly different way. In such a case, the gain is not so evidently
a gain in power but a gain in access to the decision maker. Change which
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has occurred locally is not self-evidently political, but a change in the
expectations of an official or a court willing to hear new perspectives
and take a wider range of outcomes into account. If administrators (or
judges) believe they must consider all members of a disfavoured minority
inferior or beyond the protection of certain rights, little other than race
matters. Such dual legality forecloses examination of vital governance
issues through further logical and factual inquiry. When minority status
is no longer a barrier to further inquiry, or when minority status itself is
admitted to be a complex and puzzling fact, the nature of decision making
changes and may be held to a different standard (for insightful case studies, see Stinchcombe, 2001 and Herzfeld, 1993).
It is no surprise that law, government and civil society are mutually
interdependent. While law may be 'politics by other means', law is also
a symbolic resource which, under the right circumstances, strengthens
opposition to authority. Cause lawyers encourage the co-evolution of law
and society by creating political space for a wider range of imagination
and action. Equal access to decision makers is more important than
cause, and in turn, strengthens the independence of the decision makers
by reinforcing their legitimacy. The rule of law is strong in the United
States precisely because the courts have made themselves invaluable as
enforcers, power allocators, brokers, and legitimators for (and against)
so many causes. Cause lawyers must be free to advocate for and against
traditional and non-egalitarian elements of the existing social system,
keeping alive alternatives and a debate about access to them.
Granting access to advocates for a wide range of causes and social
visions under a broad principle of equality and individual choice also holds
risks. An Islamic woman claiming equal rights under CEDAW may create
a dilemma with important institutional implications. A liberal, egalitarian
rule of law requires that the woman have equal access to the courts to
make her case for a particular balance of rights and tradition. Granting
her access also undermines the authority of a traditional community that
may be valued by the woman herself. Yet, to deny her access out of respect
for the authority of the Islamic community is to institutionalise a dual
legality, compatible with ideals of the YLM. This dilemma is only one of
many which will be encountered globally as the rule of law is fully adapted
to societies which may want to protect some communities whose values
conflict with the prescription for universality of rights.
Cause lawyers can play an important role in building institutions that
protect rights and individual choice. I have argued that cause lawyers'
access to decision makers, independent of the cause, encourages a multisided discourse about alternative goals and means within society. In the
end, this hope may be fragile indeed, for actually strengthening equal
and just rights also depends on co-evolution of society willing to demand
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rights, independent institutions with legitimacy, and political support for
law that courts and cause lawyers alone have little power to determine.

Notes
This essay grows from work on a larger project studying cause lawyers in
Southeast Asia, but the specific question I address here is more general
and predates my current research. I would like to thank Rick Abel, Steve
Ellmann, David Engel, Bryant Garth, John Gillespie and Austin Sarat for
helpful conversations and advice. I owe special thanks to Susan Silbey for
an especially provocative conversation which has had more influence on my

thinking about cause lawyers than either of us could have anticipated at the
time. Research referred to in the text has been supported by the Law School
1

2

Admissions Council and a New York Law School faculty research grant.
I note also the recent mass demonstration by Muslims in Cairo demanding
a central role for Islam in the Egyptian state, presumably in anticipation of
drafting a new constitution. (Shadid, 2011).
Western constructions of 'crony capitalism' and 'corruption' sometimes turn
on just such disagreements with bureaucrats in systems of authority adapted

to long-standing limitations of the polity and few rewards for serving a mass
public while resisting cooperation with powerful patrons or clients (Connors,
2003: 96).
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